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Abstract
In Central Differential Privacy (CDP), there is a trusted an-
alyst who collects the data from users and publishes the
datasets/statistics after the procedure of random perturbation.
However, in this paradigm, the submitted users’ raw data
is completely revealed to the analyst. In Local Differential
Privacy (LDP), each user locally perturbs the data before sub-
mitting it to the data collector. Users no longer need to fully
trust the analyst. Nevertheless, the LDP paradigm suffers from
a strong constraint on the utility of statistical functions. To
tackle the conflicts, recent works propose the shuffle model
to enhance the utility of LDP mechanism. A new participant,
i.e., shuffler, is introduced between users and the analyst to
produce the privacy amplification.
In this paper, we propose DUMP (DUMmy-Point-based),
a framework for privacy-preserving histogram estimation
in shuffle model. DUMP can summarize all existing his-
togram estimation protocols in shuffle model. We introduce
dummy blanket intuition to analyze the advantage of dummy
points in improving utility. Then we design two protocols:
pureDUMP and mixDUMP under DUMP framework, which
achieve better trade-offs between privacy, accuracy, and com-
munication than existing protocols. We also prove that dummy
points have privacy amplification locally, which can achieve
enhanced privacy protection on the shuffler. Besides, exist-
ing related studies lacks experimental evaluation that results
are still in the theoretical stage. We conduct a comprehen-
sive experimental evaluation to evaluate our proposed pro-
tocols and existing other protocols. Experimental results on
both synthetic and real-world datasets show that our proposed
protocols achieve better utility for both accuracy and com-
munication under the same privacy guarantee than existing
protocols.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy is the de facto standard privacy definition
for statistical analysis on sensitive datasets. Many differen-
tially private algorithms have been deployed in the indus-
try [13, 17, 27, 31] to protect individual privacy. The studies
on differential privacy focus on two models: Central Dif-
ferential Privacy (CDP) [15] and Local Differential Privacy
(LDP) [24]. In CDP model, a trusted analyst collects raw
data from users and releases a differentially private output.
Although many accurate private algorithms have been pro-
posed in CDP model, the model is limited when there is no
trusted analyst. To remedy this, the analyst is assumed to be
untrusted in LDP model. Each user perturbs its raw data lo-
cally using a privacy-preserving mechanism before sending it
to the analyst. However, existing LDP designs suffer from a
large and inevitable estimation error while requiring weaker
trust assumptions. The study shows that the error is at least
Ω(
√
n) for a wide range natural problems in LDP model (n
is the number of users), while an error of just O(1) can be
achieved in CDP model [14].
The above problem has motivated the study of new models
with trust assumptions better than CDP model and estimation
error smaller than LDP model. Recently, a series of models are
proposed, and these models are mainly focused on introducing
new participants. Multiple models are based on the idea of
cryptographic, such as using homomorphic encryption [29].
Some are based on the idea of shuffle. Compared with crypto-
based models, shuffle models are more efficient since they
do not involve relatively heavy (public key) cryptographic
operations. The earliest shuffle model is under the Encode,
Shuffle, Analyze (ESA) architecture proposed by Bittau et
al. [8], which introduces a trusted shuffler between users and
an untrusted analyst. The shuffler is responsible for shuffling
all messages received from users before passing them to the
analyst. The privacy is enhanced since the analyst cannot
associate any message with any individual user. The following
works give the formal proofs of privacy benefits brought by
shuffle model [5, 11, 16]. Among these works, Balle et al. [5]
provide the tightest upper bound of the privacy budget so far
that ε can be reduced to
√
14ln(2/δ) · (eε+ k−1)/(n−1)
for arbitrary randomized response. Here, k is the size of data
domain, ε and δ are privacy parameters. A lot of recent works
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try to settle the trade-offs between privacy, accuracy, and
communication. Many frequency estimation protocols are
developed [3, 4, 19].
In this work, we study the histogram estimation in shuffle
model. Several well-designed protocols for histogram esti-
mation in shuffle model have been proposed [3, 19, 37]. Al-
though some protocols achieve high accuracy [3,19], i.e., error
O(log(1/δ)/(ε2n)) is achieved, the number of messages that
each user needs to send is proportional to the size of data do-
main. The sizes of data domain are always tens of thousands
in the practical statistical tasks, which can cause an unbear-
able communication load for users. Besides, some existing
protocols have limited effective range that they can only work
well on datasets with small data domain, the privacy budget
ε ∈ [0,1] cannot always be satisfied on some datasets [5, 19].
Moreover, although the shuffler has many cryptographic im-
plementations such as onion routing, mixnets, and secure hard-
ware, it cannot prevent the collusion between the shuffler(s)
and analyst. Once the shuffler conspires with the analyst,
users’ privacy is only protected by degraded local privacy-
preserving mechanisms. We also find that the existing studies
do not have sufficient experimental evaluation, which causes
the existing results are still in the theoretical stage.
Our Contributions. Focusing on the above problems, we do
the following works.
First, we propose a novel framework DUMP (DUMmy-
Point-based) for histogram estimation in shuffle model. All
the existing histogram estimation protocols in shuffle model
can be described by DUMP framework. We divide the client-
side into two parts: local randomizer and dummy points gen-
erator, while existing protocols do not distinguish between
randomizing data and introducing dummy points. In fact, they
are two different privacy protection mechanisms. The local
randomizer perturbs the input data and only provides pro-
tection for the input data, and it can be almost all existing
locally privacy protection mechanisms (RR, Rappor, OLH).
The dummy points generator generates dummy points to hide
the input data, and can also provide the same strength of pri-
vacy protection for other participants’ data after shuffling.
Here, we propose dummy blanket intuition, is that each user
can be wrapped in a dummy blanket composed of all users’
dummy points by generating a fixed number of dummy points.
The communication load of dummy blanket is shared by all
users. Therefore, when the number of users is large, DUMP
enables each user to enjoy stronger privacy guarantee with
less communication load. Under the DUMP framework, it
is possible to design new protocols with better trade-offs be-
tween privacy, accuracy, and communication.
Then we design two multi-message protocols of DUMP
for privacy-preserving histogram estimation in shuffle model.
One is pureDUMP protocol that users do not use any other pri-
vacy protection mechanism except generating dummy points,
and privacy guarantee is only comes from dummy blanket.
Another is mixDUMP protocol which combines DUMP with
Randomized Response (RR). We show the advantages of
dummy points in shuffle model compared our protocols with
existing protocols, including protocol [5] that only uses RR to
provide protection. For a k-bin histogram, we show that pure-
DUMP has expected error O(
√
log(1/δ)/(nε)), and where
each user sends O(k log(1/δ)/(nε2)) messages of O(log2 k)
bits. It achieves the best privacy, accuracy, and communica-
tion trade-offs among existing protocols. We also prove that
dummy points can enhance the privacy of the RR mechanism,
and the users can get stronger privacy protection than RR
on shuffler side in mixDUMP protocol. Both the protocol
design and privacy proof of pureDUMP and mixDUMP do
not introduce too many parameter restrictions, so protocols
can be applied to different datasets.
Meanwhile, we also propose relaxed version of pureDUMP
and mixDUMP with weakened condition assumptions con-
sidering the different communication bandwidth and privacy
requirements of users in practical applications. The relaxed
DUMP protocols do not force each user to generate a fixed
number of dummy points. It allows each user to generate a
fixed number of dummy points with a certain probability or
send only one data. For relaxed pureDUMP and mixDUMP
protocol, we provide privacy and utility analysis, respectively.
Besides, since most of existing shuffle-related works lack
of experimental evaluation, the shuffle mechanisms are still
most at the stage of theoretical research. We try our best to im-
plement the existing privacy-preserving histogram estimation
protocols in shuffle model. Under the same privacy guarantee,
we compare the accuracy and communication load of DUMP
protocols with other existing protocols. Experimental results
show that pureDUMP and mixDUMP protocols outperform
other protocols in both accuracy and communication load,
and they are always valid on different datasets.
Main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel framework DUMP for histogram
estimation in shuffle model, which can compatible with
almost all existing related protocols. We introduce the
dummy blanket intuition, which can be wrapped around
any privacy-preserving mechanisms to provide addi-
tional privacy protection.
• We design two multi-message protocols of DUMP for
privacy-preserving histogram estimation. We prove that
both of them have theoretical improvements over exist-
ing protocols. We also prove that dummy points can
enhance the privacy of RR mechanism, and achieve
stronger privacy guarantee on the shuffler. To adapt to
actual deployment, we also analyze the relaxed DUMP
protocols with weakened assumptions.
• We implement the existing privacy-preserving histogram
estimation protocols in shuffle model. We evaluate pro-
posed protocols using both synthetic datasets and real-
world datasets, which is shown to have higher perfor-
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mance (i.e., less MSE, less messages) than existing pro-
tocols. Experimental results also validate the correctness
of our theoretical analysis.
2 Background
2.1 Central Differential Privacy
The initial setting of differential privacy is defined in the
centralized model [15]. In this model, a trusted analyst collects
raw data from users, gathers them into a dataset, and works
out the statistical results. The statistical results are perturbed
by analyst before being released. The adversary cannot infer
whether an individual user’s data is involved in the statistics
from the released statistical results. Intuitively, differential
privacy protects each individual’s privacy by requiring any
single element in the dataset has limited impact on the output.
Definition 1 (Central Differential Privacy, CDP). An algo-
rithm M satisfies (ε,δ)-DP,where ε,δ≥ 0, if and only if for
any neighboring datasets D and D′ that differ in one element,
and any possible outputs R ⊆ Range(M ), we have
Pr [M (D) ∈ R ]≤ eεPr[M (D′) ∈ R ]+δ
Here, ε is a parameter called the privacy budget. The
smaller ε means that the outputs of M on two adjacent
datasets are more similar, that is, the smaller ε provides the
stronger privacy guarantee. Meanwhile, δ is generally inter-
preted as M not satisfying ε-DP with probability δ. Without
loss of generality, in this paper, we denote the elements of
D and D′ as [x1,x2, . . . ,xn] and [x1,x2, . . . ,x′n], i.e., we assume
that the nth element of two datasets is different.
2.2 Local Differential Privacy
The assumption of CDP cannot always hold because it’s hard
to find a trusted analyst in practice. Unlike the central model,
there is no fully trusted analyst in the local model [24]. Each
user locally perturbs its data using a randomized mechanism
before sending it to the untrusted analyst, and the analyst
cannot access users’ raw data.
Definition 2 (Local Differential Privacy, LDP). An algorithm
M satisfies (ε,δ)-LDP, where ε,δ≥ 0, if and only if for any
different elements v,v′ ∈ D , and any possible outputs R ⊆
Range(M ), we have
Pr [M (v) ∈ R ]≤ eεPr[M (v′) ∈ R ]+δ
Denote D as the data domain, v and v′ are two different
elements in D. LDP guarantees that the change from v to v′
cannot be inferred from the results of M . The strength of
privacy protection is still controlled by privacy budget ε. The
smaller ε indicates that the adversary has lower confidence to
distinguish any pairs of input v and v′ from the output. Here
δ is usually equal to 0.
2.3 Randomized Response
Randomized Response (RR) is a technique firstly proposed
by Warner et al. [38]. It provides plausible deniability to
users when answering sensitive questions. Intuitively, con-
sider investigating whether a group of people have HIV. Each
participant decides how to response investigation by tossing a
coin. If the coin is head, it responses true answer. Otherwise,
it tosses the coin again, and responses “Yes” when it is head
or “no” on the contrary.
Although RR can only use for binary data, it also can ex-
tend to the general multi-valued data domain by Generalized
Randomized Response (GRR) [34]. Let k be the size of the
data domain D. Each user with private value v ∈ D reports
the true value v′ = v with probability p and sends a randomly
picked value v′ ∈ D where v′ 6= v with probability q. The
perturbation probability can be defined as
p =
eε
eε+ k−1
q =
1
eε+ k−1
(1)
Note that GRR satisfies ε-LDP, since pq = e
ε.
After receiving n randomized messages, the analyst esti-
mates f˜v of element v in users’ messages. Let ∑1v′=v be the
count of v appearing in randomized messages. The analyst
estimates f˜v as
f˜v =
1
n
· ∑1v′=v−nq
p−q
The variance of f˜v is
Var[ f˜v] = n · k−2+ e
ε
(eε−1)2
Without generality, in this paper, we assume that the data
domain D with size k is [k], where k stands for [1, . . . ,k]. It
is trivial to map any data domain D containing k elements
into [k], just by publicly constructing a index map between
elements in D and indexes i ∈ [k].
2.4 Shuffle Model
The earliest shuffle model is the Encode, Shuffle, Analyze
(ESA) architecture proposed by Bittau et al. [8]. There are
three parts in ESA architecture: encoder, shuffler, and analyst.
The encoder runs on users’ devices, applying a randomiza-
tion mechanism to the users’ data. The shuffler collects all
users’ data and eliminates their order information to ensure
data anonymity. The analyst performs statistical tasks on the
anonymous dataset received from the shuffler, and it cannot
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relate any randomized data to any individual user. Actually,
the shuffle model increases the uncertainty of analyst guessing
the users’ raw data. This uncertainty brings privacy benefits
to users, allowing them to introduce less noise to obtain the
same strength of privacy guarantee.
Following the notation in [11], the protocols in shuffle
model includes three algorithms:
- R: X → Y m. R is the local randomized encoder, it takes
a single user’s data xi as input and outputs a set of m
messages yi,1, ...,yi,m ∈ Y .
- S: Y nm→ Y ∗. S is the shuffler, it takes all users’ output
messages of R as input and outputs these messages in a
uniformly random order.
- A: Y ∗→ Z. A is the analyst, it takes all the output mes-
sages of S as input and run some analysis function on
these messages.
The overall protocol can be denoted as P = (R,S,A).
The output of P(x1, ...xn) can be given as A ◦ S ◦ Rn(~x) =
A(S(R(x1), ...,R(xn))). As long as the randomized encoder
R satisfies (ε,δ)-DP, according to the post-processing prop-
erty of differential privacy, the shuffle mechanism M = S◦Rn
also satisfies (ε,δ)-DP. That is, the protocol P is (ε,δ)-DP
whenever the randomized encoder R is (ε,δ)-DP.
3 Framework of DUMP
3.1 Framework
There are three parties in the framework of DUMP: users,
shuffler, and analyst. Figure 1 shows the interactions among
them.
Client-Side. The input of each user is only one element
xi ∈ D. There are two mechanisms on the client-side. One
is the local randomizer R, which can be almost any exist-
ing privacy protection mechanism satisfying LDP such as
Randomized Response (RR), Unary Encoding (UE), Opti-
mal Local Hash (OLH), and Hadamard Response (HR). Ac-
cording to the different privacy protection mechanisms se-
lected by users, the output of local randomizer R(xi) can be
element\vector\matrix or other forms. Besides, the users can
also choose not to process the raw data, i.e., R(xi) = xi. An-
other is dummy points generator. At the beginning, the system
calculates the number of dummy points s that each user needs
to generate according to the users’ number, the domain size
and privacy parameters. Then each user’s dummy points are
uniformly random picked from the output space of local ran-
domizer R. Finally, each user sends R(xi)mixed with s dummy
points to the shuffler.
Shuffler. The shuffler removes all implicit metadata (such as
IP address, timestamps and routing paths) of each user’s mes-
sages. Then it aggregates all n(s+1) messages together and
Local 
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Generator
Dummy Points
Generator
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Figure 1: The framework of DUMP
randomly shuffle all of messages. The shuffler is considered
credible in shuffle model. There are also some protocols in
shuffle model regard shuffler as semi-credible considering
the more practical situation. They think that the shuffler may
pry into users’ privacy and collude with the analyst due to
curiosity [37]. Note that the shuffler cannot distinguish R(xi)
from any user’s set of messages in DUMP framework.
Analyst. The analyst performs histogram estimation on the
set of messages received from the shuffler. It removes the bias
caused by dummy points and local randomizer, and obtains
unbiased estimation results.
At present, almost all histogram estimation protocols in
shuffle model can be summarized with the framework of
DUMP. Ghazi et al. [19] proposed two different histogram
estimation protocols in shuffle model: private-coin protocol
and public-coin protocol. The private-coin protocol uses HR
as the local randomizer. The protocol uniformly random gen-
erates ρ tuples that the same form as the output of HR, which
can be seen as picking dummy points randomly from the
output space of the local randomizer. The outputs of local
randomizer in the public-coin protocol are τ tuples calculated
by τ hash functions. The protocol then generates at most s
dummy tuples for each hash function, is that each user sends at
most τ+ τ∗ s tuples to the shuffler. The histogram estimation
protocol proposed by Balcer et al. [3] can also be expressed
by DUMP framework. The output of local randomizer in this
protocol is just the user’s input data, and each user generates
at most k non-repeated dummy points.
Although existing works can be summarized with the
DUMP framework, they do not make full use of the advan-
tages of dummy points in shuffle model. They do not distin-
guish between local randomizer and dummy points generator.
Although both mechanisms can provide privacy protection
for input data satisfying LDP, the privacy benefits they obtain
from shuffling operation is different. The local randomizer
focuses on processing user’s input data, which aims to provide
privacy protection for the input data itself. The dummy points
generator does not change the input data, it generates dummy
points to hide the input data. Meanwhile, these dummy points
4
Table 1: Shuffle results for the histogram estimation. Each user is assumed to hold number of 1 value from D. ε≤ 1 for [5], ε< 1,
δ< 1/ log(d) for results from [19], and e−O(nε2) ≤ δ< 1/n for [3].
Protocol No. Messages per User No. Bits per Messages Error
shuffle-based [5] 1 O(logk) O( 1
n5/6ε2/3
· log1/3(1/δ))
private-coin [19] O( 1ε2 log
1
εδ ) O(logn logk) O(
1
n · logk+ 1εn ·
√
logk · log 1εδ )
public-coin [19] O( 1ε2 log
3 k · log( 1δ logk)) O(logn+ log logk) O( 1εn · log3/2 k ·
√
log( 1δ logk))
private-shuffle [3] O(k) O(logk) O( 1ε2n · log 1δ )
mixDUMP O( 1nε2 k · log 1δ ) O(logk) O( 1nε · (1+ ke10ε−1 ) ·
√
log 1δ )
pureDUMP O( 1nε2 k · log 1δ ) O(logk) O( 1nε ·
√
log 1δ )
also provide the same strength of privacy protection for other
users after shuffling operation.
Under the DUMP framework, we design two protocols:
pureDUMP and mixDUMP in section 4 to show the advan-
tage of dummy points in improving utility. The output of local
randomizer in pureDUMP is R(xi)= xi, while mixDUMP uses
RR as the local randomizer. We show that the dummy points
can introduce less error and communication load than the
local randomizer. The pureDUMP can get the best trade-off
between the privacy, accuracy, and communication for his-
togram estimation in shuffle model at present. Table 1 presents
our results alongside existing results, and all protocols are
used for k-bins histogram estimation in shuffle model.
3.2 Dummy Blanket
The blanket intuition is first proposed by Balle et al. [5]. In ba-
sic shuffle model, users use the RR mechanism to protect their
raw data. Each user randomizes its data with the probability
of γ, otherwise it remains unchanged. Users participating in
the randomization uniformly random pick a value from the
data domain. Hence, the k-bins histogram Y can be decom-
posed as Y = Y1 ∪Y2, where Y1 is the histogram formed by
uniformly random data and Y2 is the histogram formed by
part of users’ real data. Consider two datasets D= {x1, ...,xn}
and D′ = {x1, ...,x′n} that only differ on the nth value. The
randomized values in D and D′ form the histogram Y1, and
other unchanged values form Y2. Suppose that the adversary
knows x1, ...,xn−1, and the nth user does not participate in
the randomization. It is still difficult to distinguish xn from
Y1∪{xn} that Y1 hides xn like a random blanket.
In this paper, we propose the concept of dummy blanket.
Whether participating in the randomization or not, each user
sends s uniformly random generated dummy points to the
shuffler. ns dummy points form a histogram Y3, and Y3 hides
each user’s data like a dummy blanket. The dummy blanket
provides the same strength of privacy guarantee for each user.
It does not conflict with any randomization mechanism, it
can be wrapped outside of the blanket formed by any local
randomizer. In the assumptions discussed above, the adversary
needs to distinguish the value of xn from Y1∪Y2∪{xn} when
each user generates dummy points.
Meanwhile, dummy blanket will not increase too much
communication load while achieving a large privacy enhance-
ment. The communication load of dummy blanket is shared
by all users. The larger the number of users, the smaller com-
munication load borne by each user. Hence, dummy blanket
is possible to achieve better trade-offs between privacy and
utility.
4 Proposed Protocols
In this section, we present new protocols of DUMP for
privacy-preserving histogram estimation that improve exist-
ing protocols in shuffle model. We analyze the privacy, ac-
curacy, and efficiency properties of each proposed protocol
theoretically.
4.1 PureDUMP: A Pure DUMP protocol
Design of Algorithms. We show details of the client-side and
analyst-side algorithms of pureDUMP protocol in Algorithm
1 and Algorithm 2. n is the number of users and k is the
size of data domain D. The protocol finally outputs a k-bins
frequency estimation histogram, including the frequency of
all values in D. The output of the local randomizer is R(x) = x
in pureDUMP that each user keeps its data unchanged. The
dummy blanket provides all privacy guarantees for users.
At the beginning, each user runs Algorithm 1 locally. That
is, each user uniformly random generates s number of dummy
points from the data domain D, which means the probabil-
ity distribution of any value in the dummy dataset follows
Bin(s, 1k ). The parameter s is calculated from n, k, ε, and δ
before the protocol starts, which will be discussed later. Then
the outputs of all client-side algorithms are aggregated into
the shuffler, and the shuffler uniformly and randomly shuffles
the order of all messages. Given the output of the shuffler,
the analyst estimates~z[i] for the frequency of each i ∈ [k] by
counting the number of messages equal to i. As all bias come
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Algorithm 1 Client-side Algorithm of PureDUMP
1: procedure P(x):
Input: x ∈ D, parameters n,k,s ∈ N
Output: Multiset Y ⊆ D
2: for i← 1 to s do . generate dummy points
3: yi←Uni f orm({1, ...,k})
4: end for
5: return Y := {y1, ...,ys}∪ x . x mixed dummy points
6: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Analyst-side Algorithm of PureDUMP
1: procedure A(y1, ...,yn(s+1)):
Input: Multiset {y1, ...,yn(s+1)} ⊆ D, parameters n,k,s ∈ N
Output: Vector~z ∈ [0, ...,n]k . frequency of k elements
2: for i← 1 to k do
3: ~z[i] = 1n · (∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]1z[i]=yi j − nsk )
4: end for
5: return~z
6: end procedure
from dummy blanket, the analyst corrects the count with the
expected value of dummy blanket to obtain an unbiased esti-
mate~z[i] of the frequency of i.
Privacy Analysis. We show the privacy guarantee of the pure-
DUMP protocol in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 The pureDUMP satisfies (εd ,δd)-DP for any
k,s,n ∈ N, εd ∈ (0,1] and δd ∈ (0,0.2907], where
εd =
√
14k · ln(2/δd)
|S|−1 , |S|= ns
Proof. Denote xi as the single value held by each user
and the number of users is n. Let D and D′ be two neigh-
boring users’ datasets with D = [x1,x2, . . . ,xn], and D′ =
[x1,x2, . . . ,x′n]. There is only one data difference between D
and D′. Without loss of generality, we assume that xn = 1
in D, and x′n = 2 in D′. S and S′ are two different dummy
datasets generated by users. The size of dummy datasets
|S|= |S′|= ns, where s is the number of dummy points gener-
ated by each individual user. What the analyst sees is a mixed
dataset~r consists of the original user dataset D(D′) and the
dummy dataset S(S′). Therefore, when pureDUMP satisfies
(εd ,δd)-DP, the following inequality needs to be satisfied
Pr[D∨S =~r]≤ eεd Pr[D′∨S′ =~r]+δd
Denote n j as the number of value j in the users’ dataset
and s j as the number of value j in the dummy dataset. If the
number of k different values appear in D is [n1,n2−1, ...,nk],
then the number of values appear in D′ is [n1−1,n2, ...,nk]. In
order to ensure that the difference between D and D′ cannot
be inferred from the output~r, the number of k different val-
ues in dummy dataset S and S′ should be [s1− 1,s2, ...,sk]
and [s1,s2 − 1, ...,sk], respectively. Then we can simplify
Pr[D∨S=~r]
Pr[D′∨S′=~r] to the following formula
Pr[D∨S =~r]
Pr[D′∨S′ =~r] =
(
|S|
s1−1,s2,...,sk)
(
|S|
s1,s2−1,...,sk)
=
s1
s2
where s1 and s2 are the number of values 1 and 2 in dummy
dataset. They follow binomial distribution S1 and S2, where
S1 ∼ Bin(|S|−1, 1k )+1 and S2 ∼ Bin(|S|−1, 1k ). The proba-
bility that it does not satisfy εd-DP is
Pr[
S1
S2
≥ eεd ]≤ δd
Let c = E[S2] =
|S|−1
k , the Pr[
S1
S2
≥ eεd ] can be divided into
two cases with overlap that S1 ≥ ceεd/2 and S2 ≤ ce−εd/2.
According to multiplicative Chernoff bound, we have
Pr[
S1
S2
≥ eεd ]≤ Pr[S1 ≥ ceεd/2]+Pr[S2 ≥ ceεd/2]
≤ e− c3 (eεd−1−1/c)2 + e− c2 (1−e−εd/2)2
≤ δd
Both e−
c
3 (e
εd−1−1/c)2 and e−
c
2 (1−e−εd/2)2 are no greater than
δd
2 . We can deduce that when εd ≤ 1 and δd ≤ 0.2907, c al-
ways satisfies c≥ 14ln(2/δd)ε2d . Put c =
|S|−1
k into the inequality,
we can get the upper bound of εd .
The detailed proof is deferred to Appendix B. 
Accuracy Analysis. We analyze the accuracy of pureDUMP
by measuring the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the estima-
tion results.
MSE =
1
k ∑v∈D
E[( f˜v− fv)2] (2)
where fv is the true frequency of element v ∈ D in users’
dataset, and f˜v is the estimation result of fv. We first show f˜v
of pureDUMP protocol is unbiased in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The estimation result f˜v for any v ∈ D in pure-
DUMP is an unbiased estimation of fv.
6
Proof.
E[ f˜v] = E
[
1
n ∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
(
1v=yi j −
ns
k
)]
=
1
n
E
[(
∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1v=yi j −
ns
k
)]
=
1
n
E
[
∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1v=yi j
]
− s
k
=
1
n
(n fv+
ns
k
)− s
k
= fv

Since f˜v is an unbiased estimation of fv, the MSE of f˜v
in pureDUMP is equal to the variance of f˜v according to
Equation 2.
MSE =
1
k ∑v∈D
E[( f˜v− fv)2] = 1k ∑v∈D
(Var[ f˜v]+ [E[ f˜v]− fv]2)
=
1
k ∑v∈D
Var( f˜v)
(3)
Now we calculate the MSE of f˜v in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 The MSE of frequency estimation in pureDUMP
is
MSE =
s(k−1)
nk2
Proof.
Var[ f˜v] =Var
[
1
n
(
∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1v=yi j −
ns
k
)]
=
1
n2
Var
[
∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1v=yi j
]
=
1
n2
(
1
k
· (1− 1
k
) ·ns)
=
s(k−1)
nk2
According to Equation 3, we have
MSE =
1
k ∑v∈D
E[( f˜v− fv)2] = 1k ∑v∈D
Var( f˜v) =
s(k−1)
nk2

Efficiency Analysis. Now we analyze the efficiency of the
pureDUMP protocol. On input xi ∈ D, the output of each
client-side P(x) consists of s+ 1 messages of length log2 k
Algorithm 3 Local Randomizer of MixDUMP
1: procedure R(x):
Input: x ∈ D, parameters k ∈ N and λ ∈ [0, 1]
Output: xr ∈ D
2: b← Ber(λ) . Randomize data with probability λ
3: if b = 0 then
4: xr← x
5: else
6: xr←Uni f orm({1, ...,k})
7: end if
8: end procedure
bits. The runtime of the client-side is mainly spent on gener-
ating s random values. For a dataset, when the pureDUMP
protocol satisfies (ε,δ)-DP on the analyst-side, s is at most
O(k ln(1/δ)/(nε2)). The shuffler needs to send n(s+1) mes-
sages to the analyst with the space of n(s+1) log2 k. The run-
time of analyst on input n(s+1) messages is at most kn(s+1)
and its output has space O(k log2(n(s+1))) bits.
The estimation error in pureDUMP protocol is
O(log(1/δ)/(nε)). Note that the error is hardly affected by
the size of data domain D. Because although the larger D can
increase the error introduced by dummy points, there are
more dummy points are generated at the same time. So the
influence of the domain size on the estimation error can be
offset.
4.2 MixDUMP: DUMP with Randomized Re-
sponse
Design of Algorithms. MixDUMP protocol is a DUMP pro-
tocol using RR mechanism as the local randomizer, which is
also used for privacy-preserving histogram estimation. The
privacy guarantee for users provided by the randomization
and dummy points.
Each user randomizes its data with Algorithm 3. Note that
λ is the probability of users participating in the randomization.
It means that each user uniformly random picks a value from
the data domain D with the probability of λ, and remains
unchanged with the probability of 1−λ. Note that the form
of Algorithm 3 is a little different from the RR mechanism.
In order to analyze the amplification of RR mechanism in
shuffle model, we decomposed RR into
Pr[x = xr] = (1−λ)1x=xr +λPr[Unif([k])]
According to the RR, each user changes its value to other
values in D with the probability of q = 1/(eε+ k−1), where
the εl is the privacy budget of the RR. Therefore, we have
λ= kq =
k
eεl + k−1
Then each user uniformly random picks s dummy points
and mixes them with the output of the local randomizer. Here,
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Algorithm 4 Client-side Algorithm of MixDUMP
1: procedure M(x):
Input: x ∈ D, parameters n,k,s ∈ N and λ ∈ [0, 1]
Output: Multiset Y ⊆ D
2: xr← R(x) . randomize real data with RR
3: Y ← P(xr) . generate dummy points
4: return Y := {y1, ...,ys}∪ xr
5: end procedure
Algorithm 5 Analyst-side Algorithm of MixDUMP
1: procedure A(y1, ...,yn(s+1)):
Input: Multiset {y1, ...,yn(s+1)} ⊆ D
2: parameters n,k,s ∈ N, λ ∈ [0, 1]
Output: Vector~z ∈ [0, ...,n]k . frequency of k elements
3: for i← 1 to k do
4: ~z[i] = 1n ·(∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]1z[i]=yi j−nλ · 1k − nsk )/(1−
λ)
5: end for
6: return~z
7: end procedure
the Algorithm 1 can be called directly in the step of gener-
ating dummy points. Finally, the analyst removes the bias
introduced by the local randomizer and dummy points to get
unbiased estimation results. The algorithms of client-side and
analyst-side are shown in Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5.
Privacy Analysis. We show the privacy guarantee of the mix-
DUMP protocol in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 The mixDUMP satisfies (εs,δs)-DP for any
k,s,n ∈ N, εs ≤ 1, 0 < λ≤ 1 and δs ∈ (0,0.5814], where
εs =
√
14k ln(4/δs)
|S|+(n−1)λ−√2(n−1)λ ln(2/δs)−1 , |S|= ns
Proof. Denote D and D′ as two adjacent users’ datasets with
only one element difference, and S and S′ are two different
dummy datasets. We assume that nth user has different value
in D and D′. In the mixDUMP, each user randomizes its real
data with the probability of λ. If nth user randomizes its data,
then we can easily get
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r]
Pr[R(D′)∨S′ =~r] = 1
So we focus on the situation that nth user does not random-
ize its data. As the distribution of any element in users’ dataset
can be decomposed into two distributions after randomizing
by Algorithm 3, which can be formulated as
Pr[R(x) = xr] = (1−λ)1x=xr +λPr[Unif([k])]
The dummy points are uniform randomly picked from data
domain D. Therefore, the distribution of the dummy dataset is
the same as the distribution of the users’ data participating in
randomization. Denote H as the set of users participating in
randomization, the mixDUMP can be regarded as pureDUMP
with dummy dataset H ∨ S is introduced. We can get the
following formula directly from the result of Theorem 1 as
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r]≤ eεH Pr[R(D′)∨S′ =~r]+ δs
2
,
where εH =
√
14k ln(4/δs)
|H|+ |S|−1 ,δs ≤ 0.5814
Further, since |H| follows Bin(n−1,λ), according to Chernoff
bound we can get
Pr[|H|< (1− γ)µ]< δs
2
where γ=
√
2ln(2/δs)
(n−1)λ . Then we have
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r]
≤ Pr[R(D)∨S =~r∩|H| ≥ (n−1)λ−
√
2(n−1)λ ln(2/δs)]+ δs2
Let t = (n−1)λ−√2(n−1)λln(2/δs), we have
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r]
≤ (∑
h≥t
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r]Pr[H = h])+ δs
2
≤ e
√
14k ln(4/δs)
t+|S|−1 Pr[R(D′)∨S =~r]+δs
= e
√
14k ln(4/δs)
(n−1)λ−√2(n−1)λ ln(2/δs)+|S|−1 Pr[R(D′)∨S =~r]+δs
The details of this proof is in Appendix C. 
Accuracy Analysis. We still use MSE as metrics to analyze
the accuracy of mixDUMP protocol. Same as before, we first
show f˜v is unbiased in mixDUMP in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The estimation result f˜v for any v ∈ D in mix-
DUMP is an unbiased estimation of fv.
The proof of Lemma 2 is deferred to Appendix D. Now
we can have the MSE of frequency estimation equals to the
variance of f˜v in mixDUMP. In the following, we show the
MSE of mixDUMP in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 The MSE of frequency estimation in mixDUMP
is
1
n
· e
εl + k−2
(eεl −1)2 +
s(k−1)
nk2
· (e
εl + k−1
eεl −1 )
2
where εl is the privacy budget of LDP in mixDUMP.
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Proof. We give the estimation function in Algorithm 5.
With p = e
εl
eεl+k−1 , q =
1
eεl+k−1 in randomization, and λ= kq,
we replace λ with q to simplify the derivation. We can get the
variance of f˜v is
Var[ f˜v] =Var[
1
n
· ∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]1{v=yi j}−ns ·
1
k −nq
p−q ]
=
1
n2
· 1
(p−q)2 Var[ ∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}]
=
1
n2
· 1
(p−q)2 (n fv p(1− p)+n(1− fv)q(1−q)
+ns · 1
k
· k−1
k
)
=
1
n2
· 1
(p−q)2 (nq(1−q)+n fv(p(1− p)−q(1−q))
+ns · 1
k
· k−1
k
)
' 1
n2
· 1
(p−q)2 (nq(1−q)+ns ·
1
k
· k−1
k
)
=
1
n2
· (e
εl + k−1
eεl −1 )
2 · (n(e
εl + k−2)
(eεl + k−1)2 +
k−1
k2
·ns)
=
1
n
· e
εl + k−2
(eεl −1)2 +
s(k−1)
nk2
· (e
εl + k−1
eεl −1 )
2
We have proved in Lemma 2 that f˜v is unbiased in mixDUMP,
hence, we have
MSE =
1
k ∑v∈D
E[( f˜v− fv)2] = 1k ∑v∈D
Var( f˜v) =
1
n
· e
εl + k−2
(eεl −1)2 +
s(k−1)
nk2
· (e
εl + k−1
eεl −1 )
2

Efficiency Analysis. Next, we show the efficiency analy-
sis of the mixDUMP protocol. On input xi ∈ D, the out-
put of the client-side M(xi) is at most O(s+ 1) messages
of length log2 k bits. The total runtime of the client-side
is mainly spent on randomizing data and generating s ran-
dom dummy points. Because we amplified twice in the pro-
cess of proving the upper bound of the privacy budget in
the mixDUMP protocol, the advantage of mixDUMP com-
pared to pureDUMP in the number of messages is weakened.
When the mixDUMP protocol satisfies (ε,δ)-DP, s is at most
O(14k ln(4/δ)/(nε2)−λ(1−√2ln(2/δ)/(λn))). The upper
bound of s can be approximately to O(14k ln(4/δ)/(nε2))
when ε is close to 0.
The shuffler still sends n(s+1) dummy points to the analyst
with the space of n(s+ 1) log2 k bits. The analyst outputs
O(k log2(n(s+1)) bits estimated from n(s+1)messages with
error O(
√
ln(1/δ)/(nε(1−λ))). Note that λ is the probability
that each user randomizes its data, it equals to k/(eεl +k−1).
The larger εl is, the closer the accuracy of mixDUMP is to
pureDUMP. We usually set εl = 10ε, so the estimation error
can be approximated as O( 1nε · (1+ ke10ε−1 ) ·
√
log 1δ ).
4.3 Relaxed Protocols under Weakened As-
sumption
We propose two protocols for privacy-preserving histogram
estimation in Subsection 4.1 and Subsection 4.2. Meanwhile,
under the assumption that each user sends s dummy points,
we analyze the performance of the proposed protocols theoret-
ically. In practical applications, some users may be restricted
by bandwidth and equipment, and some users may even refuse
to send additional dummy points. Taking these conditions into
account, we also analyze the privacy and accuracy of the pro-
posed protocols under the weakened assumption.
We assume that each user sends dummy points with the
probability of γ. It means that each user uniformly random
picks s dummy points from data domain D with the probabil-
ity of γ, and only sends one message with the probability of
1−γ. First, we try to answer how much the weakened assump-
tion affects the privacy of protocols in DUMP framework. We
proof the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For any DUMP protocols that satisfy (ε, δ)-DP
for any n ∈ N and γ ∈ (0,1], the relaxed DUMP protocols
satisfy (ε+ ln( 11−e−γn ), δ+ e
−γn)-DP.
Proof. The method of proof is inspired by [21]. The prob-
ability that all users do not generate dummy data is Pr[A] =
(1− γ)n. As et ≥ 1+ t, we can get 1− γ ≤ e−γ, therefore
Pr[A]≤ e−γn and Pr[A]≥ 1− e−γn. According to the results
of Theorem 1 and Theorem 3, the DUMP protocols have
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r|A]≤ eεPr[R(D′)∨S′ =~r|A]+δ
where R(D) and R(D′) are outputs of local randomizers in
DUMP, S and S′ are sets of dummy points.
Then we have
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r] = Pr[R(D)∨S =~r|A]Pr[A]+Pr[R(D)∨S|A]Pr[A]
≤ Pr[R(D)∨S =~r|A]+ e−γn
≤ eεPr[R(D′)∨S′ =~r|A]+δ+ e−γn
≤ 1
Pr[A]
· eεPr[R(D′)∨S′ =~r]+δ+ e−γn
≤ 1
1− e−γn · e
εPr[R(D′)∨S =~r]+δ+ e−γn

According to Lemma 3, we can get Theorem 5 and Theo-
rem 6, where |S| is the total number of dummy points sent by
users. We show that if each user sends dummy points with
the probability of γ, it can increase the privacy budget and the
failure probability of DUMP protocols. Because under this
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weakened assumption, there is a possibility that no user sends
dummy points, and it may cause the protocols to fail to satisfy
DP.
Theorem 5 The relaxed pureDUMP protocol satisfies (εd +
ln( 11−e−γn ), δd + e
−γn)-DP for any k, |S|,n ∈ N, γ ∈ (0,1],
where δd ∈ (0,0.2907], and εd =
√
14k ln(2/δd)/(|S|−1).
Theorem 6 The relaxed mixDUMP protocol satis-
fies (εs + ln( 11−e−γn ), δs + e
−γn)-DP for any k, |S|,n ∈
N, λ ∈ (0,1], γ ∈ (0,1], where δs ∈ (0,0.5814], and εs =√
14k ln(4/δs)/(|S|+(n−1)λ−
√
2(n−1)λ ln(2/δs)−1).
Next, we analyze the impact of weakened assumptions on
the accuracy of the DUMP protocols. We still first show that
the estimation results of relaxed pureDUMP and mixDUMP
protocols are unbiased in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. The proofs
of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 are deferred to Appendix E and
Appendix F.
Lemma 4 The estimation result f˜v for any v ∈ D in relaxed
pureDUMP is an unbiased estimation of fv.
Lemma 5 The estimation result f˜v for any v ∈ D in relaxed
mixDUMP is an unbiased estimation of fv.
Although the weakened assumption reduces the strength of
privacy protection, a smaller number of dummy points reduces
the MSE of the estimation results. We show the accuracy of
the relaxed DUMP protocols in Theorem 7 and Theorem 8,
and proofs are deferred to Appendix G and Appendix H.
Theorem 7 The MSE of frequency estimation in relaxed pure-
DUMP is
sγ(k− γ)
nk2
Theorem 8 The MSE of frequency estimation in relaxed mix-
DUMP is
1
n
· e
εl + k−2
(eεl −1)2 +
sγ(k− γ)
nk2
· (e
εl + k−1
eεl −1 )
2
where εl is the privacy budget of LDP in mixDUMP.
4.4 Privacy Amplification on the Shuffler
All the previous privacy analysis of protocols is the privacy
guarantee against the analyst. We analyze the privacy ampli-
fication on the shuffler in this subsection that we find that
the privacy amplification can be achieved by dummy points
locally. That is for the local randomizer satisfying εl-LDP, the
introduced dummy points can achieve an enhanced LDP with
the privacy budget smaller than εl .
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
s
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
r
x 103
k=10
k=20
k=30
Figure 2: Dummy points enhance privacy protection on the
shuffler, where εl = 5 and δ= 10−4.
We prove the privacy amplification on the shuffler of the
mixDUMP protocol in Theorem 9. We show that if each user
randomizes its data with RR mechanism to satisfy εl-LDP,
it can enjoy stronger LDP than εl-LDP on the shuffler in
the mixDUMP protocol. Moreover, we show our theoretical
results in Figure 2. We set the local randomizer satisfies εl-
LDP, where εl = 5, and show the privacy amplification on
three different size of datasets with varying number of dummy
points.
Theorem 9 If the local randomizer satisfies εl-
LDP, each user enjoys (εr,δr)-LDP for any
k
s ≤ min( 12ln(1/δ) ,(
√
c2+ 4c√
2ln(1/δ)
− c)2), where
εr = ln( k1−
√
2k ln(1/δr)/s
(1+ e
εl
s(eεl+1) )), and c =√
2ln(1/δ) · eεl (e
εl+1)
s(eεl+1)+eεl .
Proof. Denote {n1, ...,nk} as the number of each value in
the set sent by each user, and ∑ki=1 ni = s+ 1. Denote v as
the value held by a user. According to the definition of LDP,
we compare the probability of shuffler receiving {n1, ...,nk}
when v = 1 and v = 2. We proof the following formula
Pr[n1, ...,nk|v = 1]≤ eεr Pr[n1, ...,nk|v = 2]+δr
According to the Equation 1 of RR mechanism, we have
Pr[n1, ...,nk|v = 1]
Pr[n1, ...,nk|v = 2] =
eεl ( sn1−1,n2,...,nk)+(
s
n1,n2−1,...,nk)+ ...+(
s
n1,n2,...,nk−1)
eεl ( sn1,n2−1,...,nk)+(
s
n1−1,n2,...,nk)+ ...+(
s
n1,n2,...,nk−1)
≤ e
εl ( sn1−1,n2,...,nk)+(
s
n1,n2−1,...,nk)
eεl ( sn1,n2−1,...,nk)+(
s
n1−1,n2,...,nk)
=
eεlCn2n1+n2−1+C
n2−1
n1+n2−1
eεlCn2−1n1+n2−1+C
n1−1
n1+n2−1
=
eεl n1+n2
eεl n2+n1
The dummy points are uniformly random picked from the
data domain D. So n1 ∼ Bin(s, 1k ) + 1 and n2 ∼ Bin(s, 1k ).
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According to the Chernoff bound Pr[Bin(s, 1k )< (1− γ)µ]<
δ, where γ =
√
2k ln(1/δ)
s and µ =
s
k . That is Pr[Bin(s,
1
k ) ≥
s
k (1−
√
2k ln(1/δ)
s )]≥ 1−δ. Note that 1−
√
2k ln(1/δ)
s ≥ 0, so
k
s ≤ 12ln(1/δ) . Then we have
Pr[n1, ...,nk|v = 1]
Pr[n1, ...,nk|v = 2] ≤
eεl n1+n2
eεl n2+n1
=
eεl Bin(s, 1k )+ e
εl +Bin(s, 1k )
eεl Bin(s, 1k )+Bin(s,
1
k )+1
≤ Bin(s,
1
k )(e
εl +1)+ eεl
Bin(s, 1k )(e
εl +1)
=
Bin(s, 1k )
Bin(s, 1k )
+
eεl
Bin(s, 1k )(e
εl +1)
We prove that Bin(s, 1k ) ∈ [ sk (1−
√
2k ln(1/δ)
s ,s] with the prob-
ability larger than 1−δ. we have
Pr[n1, ...,nk|v = 1]
Pr[n1, ...,nk|v = 2] ≤
Bin(s, 1k )
Bin(s, 1k )
+
eεl
Bin(s, 1k )(e
εl +1)
≤ s
s
k (1−
√
2k ln(1/δ)
s )
+
eεl
s
k (1−
√
2k ln(1/δ)
s )(e
εl +1)
=
k
1−
√
2k ln(1/δ)
s
(1+
eεl
s(eεl +1)
)
and k
1−
√
2k ln(1/δ)
s
(1 + e
εl
s(eεl+1) ) ≤ eεl when ks ≤
(
√
c2+ 4c√
2ln(1/δ)
−c)2), where c=√2ln(1/δ) · eεl (eεl+1)s(eεl+1)+eεl .
To sum up, dummy points can achieve privacy en-
hancements to the RR mechanism locally when
k
s ≤ min( 12ln(1/δ) ,(
√
c2+ 4c√
2ln(1/δ)
− c)2). 
5 Evaluation
5.1 Setup
We design experiments to evaluate the performance of our pro-
posed protocols (pureDUMP and mixDUMP) and compare
them with the existing protocols (private-shuffle [3], private-
coin, public-coin [19]). We note that although the source
codes of these existing protocols are not formally released,
we still implemented it with our best effort and included them
for comparison purposes.
In experiments, we want to measure (1) the accuracy of our
proposed protocols, i.e., how much accuracy they improve
over existing shuffle protocols; (2) the communication over-
head of our proposed protocols, i.e., how many messages does
each user needs to send; and how does it compare with exist-
ing shuffle protocols. (3) how key parameters would affect the
accuracy of our proposed protocols, i.e., the users’ number
n and the domain size k; Towards these goals, we conduct
experiments over both synthetic and real-world datasets. The
synthetic datasets allow us to adjust the key parameters of the
datasets to observe the impact on the utility of protocols. And
the real-world datasets would show the utility of our proposed
protocols in a more practical setting.
Environment. All protocols are implemented in Python 3.7
with pyhton-xxhash 1.4.4 and numpy 1.18.1 libraries. All
experiments are conducted on servers Ubuntu 18.04.4 LTS
2.50GHz with 4*32GB memory.
Synthetic Datasets. We generate six synthetic datasets by
setting different sizes of the data domain k and the number
of users n. In the first three datasets, we fix n = 500,000
and generate different datasets with k = 50, k = 500, and
k = 5000, respectively. In the rest of datasets, we fix k = 50
and generate different datasets with n = 5,000, n = 50,000,
and n = 500,000, respectively. All datasets are following
a uniform distribution. We observe that the distribution of
datasets has little effect on the performance of protocols, so
we only show the experimental results on uniform distribu-
tion.
Real-World Datasets. We conduct experiments on following
two real-world datasets.
• IPUMS [1]: We sample 1% of the US Census data from
the Los Angeles and Long Beach area for the year 1970.
The dataset contains 70187 users and 61 attributes. We
select the birthplace attribute for evaluation, which in-
cludes 900 different values.
• Kosarak [2]: This dataset contains the clickstream data
of the Hungarian online news website. There are 990002
users and 41270 different URLs. Each user is associated
with a set of URLs, hence we randomly sample a value
from each user’s set.
Competitors. We compare the following protocols.
• private-coin [19]: A multi-message protocol for his-
togram frequency estimation in shuffle model. It uses
Hadamard response as the local randomizer.
• public-coin [19]: A multi-message protocol for his-
togram frequency estimation in shuffle model. It is based
on combining the Count Min data structure [12] with
a multi-message version of randomized response [38].
The protocol is valid when ε> τ
√
90ln(2τ/δ)/n, where
τ= log(2k).
• private-shuffle [3]: A multi-message protocol for his-
togram frequency estimation in shuffle model. The pro-
tocol is effective when ε>
√
50ln(2/δ)/n.
• shuffle-based [5]: It is the strongest privacy amplification
result in shuffle model. The result shows that εl in LDP
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Figure 3: Experimental results of impact of domain size on
pureDUMP and mixDUMP, where n is fixed to 500,000, δ=
10−6.
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Figure 4: Experimental results of impact of number of users on
pureDUMP and mixDUMP, where k is fixed to 50, δ= 10−6.
can be amplified to
√
14ln(2/δ)(eεl + k−1)/(n−1)
for k-bin histogram frequency estimation. It has amplifi-
cation effect only within
√
14k ln(2/δ)/(n−1). The ε
out of the range is equivalent to no amplification effect,
take εl = ε.
• pureDUMP and mixDUMP: Our proposed protocols.
We compare with the theoretical upper bound of private-
coin, because the time complexity of private-coin is too large
on large-scale datasets. Although we use numba for accelera-
tion, on a dataset with 512 different values and 70000 users,
it takes 204s for the analyst to estimate one value. It takes
at least 2901 hours to estimate 512 values 100 times. For
datasets with hundreds of thousands and millions of users, is
even harder to achieve.
Accuracy Metrics. In our experiments, we use mean squared
error (MSE) as the accuracy metrics. For each value v in
data domain D, we compute the real frequency fv on the raw
dataset and estimate frequency f˜v on the noise dataset. Then
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Figure 5: Results of MSE varying ε on the synthetic dataset,
where the number of users n = 500,000, the domain size
k = 50.
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Figure 6: Number of messages sent by each user varying ε on
the synthetic dataset, where the number of users n= 500,000,
the domain size k = 50.
calculate their squared difference for k different values.
MSE =
1
k ∑v∈D
( f˜v− fv)2
All MSE results in experiments are averaged with 100
repeats.
5.2 Experiments with Synthetic Datasets
Overall Results. The influence of domain size k on the MSE
of pureDUMP and mixDUMP is shown in Figure 3, where
the domain size has almost no influence on the MSE of pure-
DUMP. The influence of users’ number n on the MSE of
pureDUMP and mixDUMP is shown in Figure 4, where the
MSE of pureDUMP and mixDUMP is in inverse proportion
to the number of users. Meanwhile, the small gap between
the theoretical and empirical results validate the correctness
of our theoretical error analysis.
Figure 5 and Figure 7 show MSE comparisons of all pro-
tocols on two different synthetic datasets. Our proposed pro-
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Figure 7: Results of MSE varying ε on the synthetic dataset,
where the number of users n = 500,000, the domain size
k = 500.
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Figure 8: Number of messages sent by each user varying ε on
the synthetic dataset, where the number of users n= 500,000,
the domain size k = 500.
tocols: pureDUMP and mixDUMP are always valid with
higher accuracy. Meanwhile, we draw the number of mes-
sages that each user needs to send in all protocols except
shuffle-based (always one message) in Figure 6 and Figure 8.
We observe that the number of messages sent by each user in
pureDUMP and mixDUMP is still the smallest in all Competi-
tors. Although the MSE of private-shuffle is performing simi-
lar to pureDUMP and mixDUMP, the communication load of
private-shuffle is at least one order of magnitude higher than
pureDUMP and mixDUMP.
The dummy blanket can provide sufficient privacy guaran-
tees when there are hundreds of thousands of users. Hence,
we set εl of mixDUMP equals to 8 throughout the experiment
to adapt large ε in the range of (0,1].
Influence of Domain Size. We compare the MSE of pure-
DUMP on three synthetic datasets with different sizes of data
domain in Figure 3a. The result shows that the size of the
data domain has little influence on the accuracy of pureDUMP.
Because the MSE of pureDUMP can be approximately simpli-
fied to 14ln(2/δ)k/(n2ε2(k−1)) according to our theoretical
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Figure 9: Results of MSE varying ε on the IPUMS dataset.
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Figure 10: Number of messages sent by each user varying ε
on the IPUMS dataset.
result in Subsection 4.1. The MSE can be further simplified
to 14ln(2/δ)/(n2ε2) when k is large. Figure 3b shows that
the MSE of mixDUMP is proportional to the domain size k.
Because the large size of the data domain can increase the
error introduced by local randomizer in mixDUMP.
Influence of Users Number. Figure 4a and Figure 4b shows
the influence of the number of users on the MSE of pure-
DUMP and mixDUMP, respectively. We can observe that the
MSE in inverse proportion to the number of users n. The
MSE can be reduced around two orders of magnitude by in-
creasing an order of magnitude users in both pureDUMP and
mixDUMP.
Accuracy Comparisons of Existing Protocols. We compare
all competitors on two different datasets and two different
values of δ to evaluate the accuracy of our proposed protocols.
Here, we choose two synthetic datasets that enable all the
competitors are valid as much as possible when ε belongs
to (0,1]. The comparison results are shown in Figure 5 and
Figure 7. We can observe that the pureDUMP and mixDUMP
can always enjoy the privacy amplification and have smaller
MSE than other ones. Meanwhile, we can also observe that
the pureDUMP has higher accuracy than the mixDUMP. It
means that the dummy points can introduce less error than
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Figure 11: Results of MSE varying ε on the Kosarak dataset.
the local randomizer when providing the same strength of
privacy protection. Besides, the shuffle-based has no privacy
amplification on some small ε values, which causes poor MSE
results. In addition, We didn’t draw the MSE value of some ε
which is out of the valid range of the public-coin protocol.
Communication Comparisons of Existing Protocols. We
also compare the communication load of all competitors ex-
cept shuffle-based on the same two synthetic datasets chosen
in the accuracy comparisons experiment, and the results are
shown in Figure 6 and Figure 8. The number of messages sent
by each user in shuffle-based is always 1, so we omit it in our
comparisons. Meanwhile, we also omit the ε values which
are out of the valid range of the protocol. We can observe
that each user always sends fewer messages than others in
pureDUMP and mixDUMP, where the mixDUMP requires
the least number of messages per user. Because the local ran-
domizer provides a part of privacy protection so that fewer
dummy points need to be generated.
Note that the number of dummy points that each user needs
to send is less than 1 when ε > 0.5 on both two synthetic
datasets. It means that each user does not need to send at
least one dummy point when a large ε is required, and it can
be achieved in relaxed pureDUMP and mixDUMP protocols.
We provide the parameter settings of relaxed pureDUMP
and mixDUMP for different ε on two synthetic datasets in
Appendix A.
We can also observe that when the size of the data domain
increases by an order of magnitude, the number of messages
sent by each user in all protocols increases by around an or-
der of magnitude. Note that the number of messages sent by
each user increases as ε increases in private-shuffle proto-
col. Because each user sends additional 1 with probability
of p = 1− 50ln(2/δ)/(ε2n), and the protocol assume that√
(100/n) · ln(2/δ) ≤ ε ≤ 1 so that p ∈ (1/2,1). Hence the
probability p closes to 1 when ε increases and a larger number
of 1s are sent by each user.
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Figure 12: Number of messages sent by each user varying ε
on the Kosarak dataset.
5.3 Experiments with Real-World Datasets
We also conduct experiments on two real-world datasets:
IPUMS and Kosarak. The MSE comparisons of competitors
are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 11, and their correspond-
ing communication load are shown in Figure 10 and Figure
12. The shuffle-based has no privacy amplification on both
IPUMS and Kosarak datasets, so it’s not involved in the com-
parison. Besides, because none of ε∈ (0,1] is within the valid
range of the public-coin on the IPUMS dataset, we only com-
pare it on the Kosarak dataset.
We can observe that the MSE of pureDUMP protocol is
still the smallest among all competitors on both real-world
datasets. The MSE of mixDUMP protocol is around two
orders of magnitude higher than that of private-shuffle and
public-coin on the Kosarak dataset. Because the Kosarak has
a large domain size which can cause a great impact on the ac-
curacy of the RR mechanism. But each user always sends the
least number of messages in mixDUMP protocol. The number
of each user’s messages in private-shuffle is at least two orders
of magnitude than it in mixDUMP. The public-coin protocol
has the largest communication load among competitors as its
number of messages sent by each user is O(γn log(2k)).
6 Related Works
Frequency Estimation. Frequency estimation is a commonly
used statistical analysis. It counts the frequency of elements
appear in the dataset. There are a lot of mature mechanisms
for frequency estimation in LDP. Erlingsson et al. [17] pro-
pose Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal
Response (RAPPOR) method for frequency estimation un-
der LDP. Bassily and Smith [7] propose a Random Matrix
Projection (BLH) method for succinct histograms estimation.
A general framework of frequency estimation in LDP is pro-
posed by Wang et al. [34]. Ye et al. [39] propose an optimal
schemes for discrete distribution estimation under LDP. Hay
et al. [22] generate differentially privacy histograms through
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hierarchical partitioning of data.
Quite a few frequency estimation works focus on the heavy
hitter estimation. Bassily et al. [6] propose a TreeHist protocol
to identify heavy hitters and estimate their frequencies. Qin et
al. [28] design a LDPMiner protocol to estimate heavy hitter
in a set-valued setting where each user’s value is a set of items.
Wang et al. [35] propose SVIM and SVSM protocols to find
frequent items and frequent itemsets. There are a series of
other works about finding heavy hitters [9, 23, 26, 36, 40].
Anonymous Data Collection. A lot of works focus on
anonymizing users’ messages. Some mechanisms are based
on cryptographic idea. Chowdhury et al. [29] propose a sys-
tem Cryptε that achieves the accuracy guarantees of CDP
with no trusted data collector required like LDP. Other works
like [25, 30, 32, 33] also propose protocols to anonymize mes-
sages to provide stronger privacy guarantees.
Other mechanisms are based on shuffling idea. The idea
of shuffling was originally proposed by Bittau et al. [8], they
design Encode, Shuffle, Analyze (ESA) architecture. The ESA
architecture eliminates the association between messages and
users’ identity by introducing a shuffler between users and the
analyst. But Bittau et al. [8] doesn’t show how much privacy
benefit can be provided by the shuffling operation. A lot of
following works give the formal proof of the upper bound
on the worst-case privacy loss in shuffle model. Erlingsson
et al. [16] show that the shuffling operation can reduce ε
to 12ε
√
ln(1/δ)
n . Cheu et al. [11] provide a model to study
the privacy amplification of shuffling operation. They give a
tighter upper bound for privacy loss, which can reduce ε to√
32ln(4/δ) · eε+1n . This result only for binary randomized
response. Balle et al. [5] provide the strongest result so far
that ε can be reduced to
√
14ln(2/δ) · eε+k−1n−1 for arbitrary
randomized response.
Protocols in Shuffle Model. Recent shuffle related works
focus on designing protocols in shuffle model. Not only the
better privacy-utility tradeoff is pursued, but also the commu-
nication load is considered.
There are some studies on data summation. Cheu et al.
[11] design a single message protocol for binary summation.
Each user only sends one-bit message to the analyst and has
expected error at most O(
√
log(1/δ)/ε). Ghazi et al. [18]
design a multi-message protocol for binary summation where
each user sends O(logn/ε) one-bit messages to the analyst
and has expected error at most O(
√
log(1/ε)/ε3/2). Balcer et
al. [3] propose a two-message protocol for binary summation
with expected error at most O(log(1/δ)/ε2). There are also
a lot of studies on real data summation and many excellent
protocols are proposed [4, 5, 11, 20, 21].
There are also some studies on frequency estimation. Bal-
cer et al. [3] propose a protocol for histogram estimation
where each user sends at most O(d) messages and has er-
ror at most O(log(1/δ)/(ε2n)). Ghazi et al. [19] propose
two protocols private-coin and public-coin protocols for
histogram estimation. Each user in private-coin protocol
sends at most O(log(1/εδ)/ε2) messages with error O(logd+√
log(d) log(1/(εδ))/ε). The public-coin protocol requires
each user sends at most O((log3(d) log(log(d)/δ))/ε2) mes-
sages with error O((log3/2(d)
√
log(logd/δ))/ε). A most
similarly study to our design is proposed by Wang et al. [37].
They design a protocol called PEOS, which uses Optimal
Local Hashing (OLH) or Generalized Randomized Response
(GRR) as the local randomizer and introduces multiple shuf-
flers to shuffle messages by secret sharing. Meanwhile, the
shufflers generate nr dummy points to prevent collusion at-
tack, which can be proved that it has further privacy enhance-
ments. Differentially from their work, we take advantage of
dummy points in shuffle model to pursue better trade-offs
between accuracy, privacy, and communication. In particular,
dummy points are generated by users, which can be proved
that privacy can be amplified locally before sending messages
to the shuffler.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a new framework called DUMP
for privacy-preserving histogram estimation in shuffle model.
DUMP is a general framework that can summarize all ex-
isting histogram estimation protocols in shuffle model. We
divide the client-side into two mechanisms: local random-
izer and dummy points generator, and we introduce the
dummy blanket intuition to analyze the advantages of dummy
points in shuffle model. We design two protocols: pureDUMP
and mixDUMP under DUMP framework, they achieve better
trade-offs between privacy, accuracy, and communication than
existing protocols. The pureDUMP and mixDUMP protocols
are always effective on different datasets and privacy budgets.
The pureDUMP protocol always achieves the minimum es-
timation error with the same privacy budget among existing
protocols, and mixDUMP protocol always has the minimum
number of messages. Finally, we try our best to implement all
existing histogram estimation protocols in shuffle model, and
provide an open source framework. Our work promote the
studies on shuffle model from theoretical research to practical
application. For future work, we will study to apply DUMP to
more statistical types such as real number summation, range
query and quantile query.
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A Parameter setting in relaxed pureDUMP
and mixDUMP
Table 2 and Table 3 show the number of dummy points need
to sent by a user in the relaxed pureDUMP and mixDUMP,
respectively. The number of users is 500,000, we show results
on two different k (size of data domain) and γ (probability of
a user sending dummy points).
Table 2: Number of dummy points sent by a user in relaxed
pureDUMP. We fix n = 500,000. All decimals are rounded
up.
ε
k 50 500
γ= 0.01 γ= 0.001 γ= 0.01 γ= 0.001
0.4 13 127 127 1270
0.6 6 57 57 565
0.8 4 32 32 318
1.0 3 21 21 204
Table 3: Number of dummy points sent by a user in relaxed
mixDUMP. We fix n = 500,000 and εl = 8.All decimals are
rounded up.
ε
k 50 500
γ= 0.01 γ= 0.001 γ= 0.01 γ= 0.001
0.4 12 118 119 1190
0.6 5 44 46 451
0.8 2 18 20 192
1.0 1 6 8 72
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B Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Denote n j is the number of users with a value j, and
s j is the number of dummy points equal to j. D and D′ are
adjacent users’ datasets that only one user’s value is different.
And S and S′ are two different dummy datasets. k is the size
of data domain. Suppose that there is a user changes its value
from 1 to 2, then we can represent the number of each value
in D and D′ as [n1,n2− 1, ...,nk] and [n1− 1,n2, ...,nk]. To
prevent the change from being inferred from the results, the
number of each value in S and S′ should be [s1−1,s2, ...,sk]
and [s1,s2−1, ...,sk]. Therefore we have
Pr[D∨S =~r]
Pr[D′∨S′ =~r] =
(
|S|
s1−1,s2,...,sk)
(
|S|
s1,s2−1,...,sk)
=
Cs1−1|S| C
s2
|S|−(s1−1)
Cs1|S|C
s2−1
|S|−s1
=
s1!(s2−1)!
(s1−1)!s2! =
s1
s2
Here, |S| is the total number of dummy points. s1 follows
the binomial distribution S1, and s2 follows S2, where S1 ∼
Bin(|S|−1, 1k )+1 and S2 ∼ Bin(|S|−1, 1k ). Let c = E(S2) =
|S|−1
k ,
S1
S2
can be divided into two cases with overlap that S1 ≥
ceεd/2 or S2 ≤ ce−εd/2 so we have
Pr[
S1
S2
≥ eεd ]≤ Pr[S1 ≥ ceεd/2]+Pr[S2 ≤ ce−εd/2]
= Pr[S2 ≥ ceεd/2−1]+Pr[S2 ≤ ce−εd/2]
= Pr[S2− c≥ ceεd/2− c−1]+Pr[S2− c≤ ce−εd/2− c]
= Pr[S2− c≥ c(eεd/2−1−1/c)]+Pr[S2− c≤ c(e−εd/2−1)]
According to multiplicative Chernoff bound, we have
Pr[
S1
S2
≥ eεd ]≤ e− c3 (eεd−1−1/c)2 + e− c2 (1−e−εd/2)2
To ensure that Pr[ S1S2 ≥ eεd ]≤ δd , we need
e−
c
3 (e
εd−1−1/c)2 ≤ δd
2
and e−
c
2 (1−e−εd/2)2 ≤ δd
2
For e−
c
2 (1−e−εd/2)2 ≤ δd2 , 1 − e−εd/2 ≥ (1 − e−1/2)εd ≥
εd/
√
7, where εd ≤ 1. So we can get c ≥ 14ln(2/δd)ε2d . For
e−
c
3 (e
εd−1−1/c)2 ≤ δd2 , eεd/2− 1 ≥ 1/2, so eεd/2− 1− 1/c ≥
25
54εd , where c≥ 27/εd . Therefore, we can get c≥ 3·54
2 ln(2/δd)
252ε2d
and 3·54
2
252 ≤ 14.
In summary, we can get c≥ max{ 14ln(2/δd)ε2d ,
27
εd
}. Because
εd ≤ 1, when δd ≤ 0.2907, εd ≤ 14ln(2/δd)27 can be held all the
time. So c≥ 14ln(2/δd)ε2d . Therefore, we have
|S|−1
k ≥ 14ln(2/δd)ε2d ,
is that εd ≤
√
14k ln(2/δd)
|S|−1 . 
C Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The same as the proof of Theorem 1, D and D′
are adjacent users’ datasets that there is only one element
difference between them. S and S′ are two different dummy
datasets corresponding to D and D′. Suppose nth user’s value
changes from 1 to 2, we formal D and D′ as [x1, ...,xn] and
[x1, ...,x′n].
If nth user randomizes its data, we have
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r]
Pr[R(D′)∨S′ =~r] = 1
Hence, we only derive the situation that nth user does not
randomize its data. According to randomization mechanism R,
we can find that the user’s data participating in randomization
has the same distribution as the dummy points. H denotes
the set of users randomizing their data, and H ∨S follows the
random uniform distribution. Denote |H|+ |S| as the size of
H ∨S. If the mechanism satisfies (εH ,δs/2)-DP, we can get
the privacy budget εH directly from the result of Theorem 1.
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r]≤ eεH Pr[R(D′)∨S′ =~r]+ δs
2
where εH =
√
14k ln(4/δs)
|H|+|S|−1 ,δs ≤ 0.5814. Since λ is the proba-
bility that each user randomizes its data, the number of users
participating in randomization |H| ∼ Bin(n− 1,λ). Define
µ = (n−1)λ, and γ=
√
2ln(2/δs)
(n−1)λ so that by Chernoff bound
Pr[|H|< (1− γ)µ]< e−µγ2/2 = δs
2
we have
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r] =
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r∩|H| ≥ (n−1)λ−
√
2(n−1)λ ln(2/δs)]+
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r∩|H|< (n−1)λ−
√
2(n−1)λ ln(2/δs)]
≤ Pr[R(D)∨S =~r∩|H| ≥ (n−1)λ−
√
2(n−1)λ ln(2/δs)]+ δs2
Let t = (n−1)λ−
√
2(n−1)λln(2/δs)
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r]≤ (∑
h≥t
Pr[R(D)∨S =~r]Pr[H = h])+ δs
2
≤ (∑
h≥t
(eεH Pr[R(D′)∨S =~r]Pr[H = h]+ δs
2
Pr[H = h]))+
δs
2
≤ (∑
h≥t
(eεH Pr[R(D′)∨S =~r]Pr[H = h])+δs
≤ maxh≥teεH Pr[R(D′)∨S =~r]+δs
≤ e
√
14k ln(4/δs)
t+|S|−1 Pr[R(D′)∨S =~r]+δs
= e
√
14k ln(4/δs)
(n−1)λ−√2(n−1)λ ln(2/δs)+|S|−1 Pr[R(D′)∨S =~r]+δs

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D Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. fv is the true frequency of element v appears in
users’ dataset. And f˜v is the estimation of fv. We prove f˜v of
mixDUMP is unbiased.
In the randomization mechanism, the probability that each
value keeps the true value with the probability p, and changes
to other values in the data domain with the probability of q.
We give the estimation function of mixDUMP in Algorithm
5. The formula is
f˜v =
1
n
·( ∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}−nλ(1−
1
k
)− ns
k
)/(1−2λ(1− 1
k
))
where λ= kk−1 q. To simplify derivation, we replace λ with
q, then we have estimation of f˜v
E[ f˜v] = E[
1
n
· (∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]1{v=yi j}−nq−
ns
k )
(1−2q) ]
=
1
n
·E[ (∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]1{v=yi j}−nq−
ns
k )
(1−2q) ]
=
1
n
· 1
1−2q ·E[ ∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}−nq−
ns
k
]
=
1
n
· 1
1−2q · (E[ ∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}]−nq−
ns
k
)
=
1
n
· 1
1−2q · (n fv(1−q)+n(1− fv)q+
ns
k
−nq− ns
k
)
=
1
n
· 1
1−2q · (1−2q) ·n fv
= fv

E Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. fv is the true frequency of element v appears in users’
dataset. f˜v is the estimation of fv. We prove f˜v of relaxed
pureDUMP is unbiased.
In RR mechanism, the probability that each value keeps
unchanged with the probability p, and changes to other values
with the probability of q. The relaxed pureDUMP allows user
to generate dummy points with probability of γ, and with
probability of 1− γ does not generate any dummy point. The
estimation function of relaxed pureDUMP protocol is
f˜v =
1
n
· ( ∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}−
γns
k
)
Then we have
E[ f˜v] = E[
1
n
· ( ∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}−
γns
k
)]
=
1
n
·E[ ∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}]−
γs
k
=
1
n
· (n fv+ γnsk )−
γs
k
= fv

F Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. fv is the true frequency of element v appears in users’
dataset. And f˜v is the estimation of fv. We prove f˜v of relaxed
mixDUMP is unbiased.
In RR mechanism, the probability that each value keeps
unchanged with the probability p, and changes to other val-
ues in the data domain with the probability of q. The relaxed
mixDUMP allows user to generate dummy points with proba-
bility of γ, and with probability of 1− γ does not generate any
dummy point. The estimation function of relaxed mixDUMP
is
f˜v =
1
n
·( ∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}−nλ(1−
1
k
)− γns
k
)/(1−2λ(1− 1
k
))
where λ= kk−1 q. To simplify derivation, we replace λ with q,
then we have estimation of f˜v
E[ f˜v] = E[
1
n
· (∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]1{v=yi j}−nq−
γns
k )
(1−2q) ]
=
1
n
·E[ (∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]1{v=yi j}−nq−
γns
k )
(1−2q) ]
=
1
n
· 1
1−2q ·E[ ∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}−nq−
γns
k
]
=
1
n
· 1
1−2q · (E[ ∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}]−nq−
γns
k
)
=
1
n
· 1
1−2q · (n fv(1−q)+n(1− fv)q+
γns
k
−nq− γns
k
)
=
1
n
· 1
1−2q · (1−2q) ·n fv
= fv

G Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. As each user sends dummy points with the proba-
bility of γ, the distribution of any value in dummy points is
19
Bin(ns, γk ). The estimation function of relaxed pureDUMP is
f˜v =
1
n
· ( ∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}−
γns
k
)
We have
Var[ f˜v] =Var[
1
n
· ( ∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}−
γns
k
)]
=
1
n2
·Var[ ∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}]
=
1
n2
·ns · γ
k
·1− γ
k
=
sγ(k− γ)
nk2
The Lemma 4 has been proved that the f˜v is unbiased in
relaxed pureDUMP, we have the MSE of relaxed pureDUMP
is
MSE =
1
k ∑v∈D
E[( f˜v− fv)2] = 1k ∑v∈D
Var( f˜v)
=
sγ(k− γ)
nk2

H Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. As each user generates dummy data in probabil-
ity of γ in relaxed mixDUMP, the distribution of any value
is
MSE =
1
k ∑v∈D
E[( f˜v− fv)2] = 1k ∑v∈D
Var( f˜v)
=
1
n
· e
εl + k−2
(eεl −1)2 +
sγ(k− γ)
nk2
· (e
εl + k−1
eεl −1 )
2
in dummy points is Bin(ns, γk ). The estimation function of
relaxed mixDUMP is
f˜v =
1
n
·( ∑
i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}−nλ(1−
1
k
)− γns
k
)/(1−2λ(1− 1
k
))
where λ= kk−1 q. To simplify derivation, we replace λ with q,
and with p = e
εl
eεl+k−1 , q =
1
eεl+k−1 , we have the variance of
f˜v is
Var[ f˜v] =Var[
1
n
· ∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]1{v=yi j}− γns ·
1
k −nq
p−q ]
=
1
n2
· 1
(p−q)2 Var[ ∑i∈[n], j∈[s+1]
1{v=yi j}]
=
1
n2
· 1
(p−q)2 (nq(1−q)+ns · ·
γ
k
· k− γ
k
)
=
1
n
· e
εl + k−2
(eεl −1)2 +
sγ(k− γ)
nk2
· (e
εl + k−1
eεl −1 )
2
The Lemma 5 has been proved that the f˜v is unbiased in
relaxed mixDUMP, we have the MSE of relaxed mixDUMP

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